


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
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
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North Korea: Party Anniversary Personnel Notes

Leadership turnouts at the banquet and rally marking the 30th anniversary of the Korean Workers Party on October 10 were incomplete, but the ranking confirmed several recent promotions and demotions and suggested others. The group that took the dais on both occasions was a truncated form of the Central Peoples Committee. The number of absentees was average for this sort of occasion and gave no hint of a major party shakeup.

Possible Shakeup in Liaison Bureau

Kim Chung-nin, chairman since 1969 of the Liaison Bureau which directs subversive action against the South, has apparently been demoted. Absent from National Day celebrations on September 9, Kim appeared on October 10 ranked among the candidates on the Political Committee, down about 10 places. Occupying Kim's old slot--number 10 among full members--on both September 9 and October 10, was Yim Chun-chu. It is not known whether Yim has also replaced Kim as head of the Liaison Bureau, but Yim's past assignments make this a very real possibility. Although press reports from Seoul speculate that Kim was dismissed in the aftermath of the South's discovery of tunneling activity in the DMZ, it is neither clear that the Liaison Bureau had full responsibility for the tunneling nor that Kim's possible removal was linked to it.

Yim, another graduate of Kim Il-song's guerrilla band has apparently been put back on the Political Committee after being removed in a general purge about a decade ago. He was deputy of the Liaison Bureau as early as 1955 and served at some time in the mid-sixties as its head. In the late 1950s,

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he was ambassador to Albania and Bulgaria. Yim became a candidate on the Political Committee in 1966, but was apparently removed the following year. The cause of that purge is still not understood. For the last three years, Yim has been secretary of the Central Peoples Committee, a body created by the constitution of December 1972 to strengthen party oversight of government operations. In this position, Yim had recently been ranked about thirtieth in the party hierarchy.

The first sign of Yim's promotion back onto the Political Committee--and the first hint that he might now be involved in Liaison Bureau activity--came at an October 1 banquet for officials of Chosen Soren, the General Federation of Koreans Resident in Japan.

Kim was conspicuously absent from the October 1 fete; Yim was making his first appearance with Chosen Soren officials in over two years.

Fate of Choe Chae-u

The October 10 anniversary list suggests that Choe Chae-u, missing from public view since March after having been one of the regime's most active leaders, has been demoted rather than purged. Choe, named a candidate on the Political Committee at some time in the early 1970s, was vice premier in charge of foreign economic relations. His absence, if not caused by illness, is probably related to serious planning failures in North Korean trade this year and last. Choe may retain the post of vice premier, but this spring a newly appointed vice premier, Kong Chin-tae, took over the hosting of numerous foreign government delegations and the negotiation of economic cooperation with the

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communist states. From the October 10 turnout alone, it is not possible to determine whether Choe is still a member of the Political Committee.

Yang Hyong-sop Advances

The promotion of Yang Hyong-sop, chairman of the State Control Commission, has been confirmed. Yang, regarded as the party's chief ideologue, has been playing an increasingly prominent role in dealings with foreign visitors. His promotion--up three slots to rank number 11 in the party--became evident when he hosted the late September visit of Chinese party leader Chang Chun-chiao. Yang's importance in dealing with communist parties may be related to the elevation of Kim Tong-kyu--a key figure in this field--to the broader responsibilities of vice president of the DPRK in November 1974. Yang headed the KWP Central Party School in the early 1960s; in 1967 he was named minister of higher education.

Apparent Military Promotions

Han Ik-su and Chon Mun-sop, colonel generals in the army and veterans of Kim Il-song's anti-Japanese guerrilla movement appeared for the first time ranked seven or eight steps higher than usual.

Han joined the Political Committee in late 1969 and was promoted to full membership a year later. In February 1974, several months after being replaced as director of the General Political Bureau of the army, he began to appear among the candidate members again. The party newspaper *Nodong Sinmun* identified him as a candidate as late as August 9, but Han's place on October 10--just above the lowest ranked full member on the committee--suggests that he has been restored to his former glory. In the mid and late sixties, Han played an unusually prominent

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political role in two tours as deputy minister of defense. He was ambassador to Peking from 1962 to 1964 and is said to be fluent in Chinese.

Chon Mun-sop began to appear with top-ranked party and government officials in late 1974 and was first identified as a candidate member of the Political Committee when he accompanied Kim Il-song to Peking in April. He has held several army commands. Chon was appointed to the party Central Committee in 1961. In the mid-sixties he was deputy of the Social Security Ministry, which handled domestic police and intelligence affairs. It is not clear if Chon's rank on October 10 was at the bottom of the full members' roster or at the top of that of the candidates.

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North Korea: Ever Closer to Kim Chong-il

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A dedication speech at a cemetery for "revolutionary martyrs" appears to make the first public, if oblique, connection between two important political campaigns--one honoring the deceased wife of Kim Il-song, the other building the political prominence of Kim Chong-il, son of the North Korean leader. Pyongyang may now be a good step closer to a belated acknowledgement that the young Kim holds important posts in the Korean Workers Party. The speech was delivered by Vice President Kim Tong-kyu on October 13 at a ceremony attended by 11 ranking officials, all of them veterans of Kim Il-song's prewar partisan movement.

The idolization campaign for Kim Chong-suk, first wife of Kim Il-song and mother of Kim Chong-il, began in early 1974. It was low-keyed and confined to literary journals and magazines until this summer when it was elevated to coverage in the party paper *Nodong Sinmun*. Articles about her are also appearing in the organ of the Socialist Working Youth League, and recollections about her life are now required reading. On September 22, a 30-minute broadcast about her was beamed to South Korea, and further words of praise were delivered at graveside this week, with Kim Chong-suk the only one of the hundred buried in the cemetery referred to by name.

The campaign throughout has stressed two themes: Kim Chong-suk's impeccable credentials as a revolutionary and her unbounded and unquestioning loyalty to Kim Il-song. The treatment of her prewar activities, combined with occasional references to her as "Mother Kim Chong-suk," has seemed tailored to establish the revolutionary blood credentials of her son Kim Chong-il. The harping on her devotion

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to Kim--it was such that she reputedly cut her hair to line his shoes--is part of a broader political campaign that Kim Il-song is waging to strengthen loyalty to him personally.

Both themes were used at the cemetery and were for the first time related to the generation of Kim Chong-il. In remarks that were eliminated from the KCNA English-language replay of his speech, Kim Tong-kyu noted that Kim Il-song has acted as parent and guardian to the children of the revolutionaries, raising them to take over the revolution and carry it forward. Those children had, the vice president continued in his most critical reference, "grown into trusted personnel" and were today "mature enough to carry out the wishes of their parent."

Kim Tong-kyu reported that President Kim had decided to build this cemetery for heroes of the revolution on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday in 1972. In Korea and Japan, the sixtieth birthday is the most important, and it is traditional at that time to relinquish control of one's household and business to the eldest son.

Family succession in North Korea would go against communist practice and principles. To justify violation of these precepts, Kim Il-song is apparently arguing that only a child of a revolutionary hero can safeguard the legacy of Korea's postwar political development. The speech at the cemetery seems to be a first step in making the public case for Kim Chong-il's unique suitability to eventually lead the nation.

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Cambodia: The Prince in Fun City

Prince Sihanouk received a warm welcome when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly on October 6. In a speech designed to heighten Cambodia's visibility among the nonaligned nations, the Prince denounced US "imperialism," supported various communist and Third World causes, and stressed that Cambodia would join no military alliances or power blocs.

Sihanouk twice expressed Cambodia's gratitude to those countries and "peoples" that supported the communist insurgent cause beginning in 1970 and 1971--a reminder to the Soviets in particular that they remain shut out of influence in Cambodia. The Prince expanded on this idea later in a press interview in which he labeled the USSR as a friend of the "22nd hour" and added that Cambodia will not open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union for at least two years. Although Sihanouk's phraseology may have been more his own rather than that of the Khmer communists, Phnom Penh nevertheless has given first priority in the development of diplomatic relations with its wartime allies and appears to be in no hurry to follow up the early September meeting with Soviet representatives in Hanoi.

In support of his Asian communist allies, the Prince devoted a fairly lengthy portion of his remarks to the Korean question, predictably endorsing the North Korean position and asserting that he has first-hand knowledge of North Korea's peaceful intentions. Sihanouk briefly gave strong support for the admission of the two Vietnams to the UN. He also did not neglect Cambodia's closest friend--China--and endorsed in passing the return of Taiwan to the mainland. The Chinese were very much in evidence for the prince's arrival and departure; Sihanouk also hosted a dinner for the Chinese delegation.

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The Prince offered further evidence of Cambodia's "nonalignment" by stating Phnom Penh's support for restoration of the "territorial rights" of the Palestinians, several African liberation movements, and the removal of "foreign" bases from Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico.

A relatively brief portion of the speech was devoted to Cambodia's postwar recovery. The Prince said, however, that a "development and modernization plan" would soon be implemented that would use agricultural export earnings, beginning in 1976, to finance the development of industries such as textiles and rubber. Although Chinese press replay of the speech referred to the plan, Radio Phnom Penh's somewhat abbreviated account did not. Previous propaganda broadcasts, however, have announced Cambodia's intention to export rice beginning next year.

Economic planners in Phnom Penh probably are trying to work out short-term agricultural production goals, but they are inexperienced and are almost certainly a long way from formulating a sophisticated, long range economic plan. Phnom Penh may export a small amount of rice for propaganda purposes, but the recently announced goal of harvesting three tons of rice per hectare next year for a total production of six million tons is almost certainly unattainable within the foreseeable future. It is unlikely, for example, that the upcoming harvest (to take place from November through January) will exceed last year's level of one and one-half million tons.

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Malaysia: No Quarter for Terrorists

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New draconian security proposals reflect the government's concern over the rise in urban terrorism.

Sweeping changes in laws governing the trial of defendants charged with offenses against national security will suspend the normal protection of the courts and of English common law regarding guilt by association, trial by jury, and confrontation of witnesses. The changes set aside several principles of Malaysian law, the most basic being the presumption of the accused's innocence until proven guilty. Witnesses will be able to give testimony in private session without the presence of the accused or of defense lawyers, and hearsay evidence will be admitted. There will be no recognition of mitigating circumstances, and maximum sentences must be imposed on conviction.

The proposed changes supplement the establishment last month of a population control system which charged inhabitants of residential blocks with responsibility for reporting suspicious individuals or activity. The effect of the two measures will be to curtail sharply the constitutional freedoms of Malaysians arrested on security charges. They give the government powers equivalent to martial law.

While Malaysia's some 2,000 Communist insurgents are concentrated along the Thai border, there has been a slow southward drift in recent years. The government has been alarmed by several instances this year of urban terrorism well down the peninsula. The grenade attack against a police field platoon at a Kuala Lumpur parade ground last month--and the subsequent failure of any of the

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many witnesses to come forward--apparently convinced the government that stronger measures were needed.

The new regulations have been denounced by Malaysian legal groups and by Chinese associations. The ethnic Chinese community sees them as weapons to be used against it, because most of the insurgents and urban terrorists are in fact Chinese.

The government, however, cites its good record of respecting individual civil liberties, and its spokesmen have asked the public to trust the government to safeguard against abuse of the measures. With its top-heavy majority in parliament, the government will have no trouble getting the changes enacted. Most Malaysians--concerned over terrorism --will probably accept government assurances that persons not involved with the insurgents have nothing to fear.

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